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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Since this is a criminal case not involving afirstdegree felony, this Court has
appellate jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(e).
ATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Appellee is satisfied with appellant's Statement of the Issues and therefore
does not submit its own Statement of the Issues. See Rule 24(b)( 1) of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellee is satisfied with appellant's Statement of the Case and therefore
does not submit its own Statement of the Case. See Rule 24(b)(1) of the Utah Rules
of Appellate procedure.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
At about 2:00 a.m. on July 23,2003 appellant arrived with his mother at the
emergency room ("ER") of Salt Lake L.D.S. Hospital. (Rl 55:55). As appellant entered
through the sliding glass doors he was yelling at his mother and had blood on his
clothing and on his left hand, and the tip of his left pinky finger was cut or possibly
missing. (Rl 55:55, 96). Appellant had received his injury during a fight with his
brother during which his brother also sprayed mace into his eyes. (R15 5:144). Officer
Thomas Vu ("Officer Vu") of the Salt Lake City Police Department ("SLCPD") was
2

wearing his SLCPD uniform while working as a part-time security guard for the
hospital. Officer Vu is permitted to wear his SLCPD uniform by his department while
working part-time security. (Rl 55:75). Officer Vu was not on duty for SLCPD and
was being paid by the hospital for his security-guard services. (R155:63). Amid a
loud, rude, obnoxious stream of profanity from appellant, an admissions tech got
appellant's name from him and returned to her desk. (R155:81). After that Officer Vu
met appellant in the reception area and asked whether appellant needed medical
attention, to which appellant said, "F*** you. I need to see a doctor, not a P**ing
cop." (Rl55:57, 81). Officer Vu requested appellant to calm down so he could be
triaged before seeing a doctor, to which appellant said a second time, "F*** you. I
need to see a doctor, not a f***ing cop," which was heard throughout the ER area.
(R155:57, 83, 85). While appellant sat in triage Officer Vu confirmed appellant was
the subject of a prior domestic violence dispatch that he heard about thirteen minutes
prior to appellant's arrival at the hospital. Officer Vu requested back-up police
assistance. (Rl 55:58). At the same time Officer Vu overheard appellant say two times
that when he got out of the hospital he was going to kill his brother who cut him.
(Rl 55:58). Appellant continued to yell out, demand to be seen by only a doctor and to
direct profanity at Officer Vu. (R155:59). Officer Vu then asked the charge nurse,
who was wearing green scrubs and an identification badge, to talk with appellant.
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When the charge nurse approached, appellant took a stand with clenched fists and
yelled at the charge nurse, "F*** you, a**hole," He then made threatening moves
toward Officer Vu and the charge nurse, and threatened to "kick our asses." (Rl 55:60,
71, 93,94, 99). Appellant's behav or made it impossible for the charge nurse to take
his blood pressure and screen for allergies. (Rl 55:97). After that Officer Vu thought
it best to take appellant under control to prevent appellant from hitting him or the
charge nurse. As he took hold of appellant's left arm, appellant with his right arm
swung a punch at Officer Vu but missed contact because Officer Vu avoided it.
(R155:61,72). After that, "because of [appellant's] size and stuff," Officer Vu decided
to take appellant to the ground where there would be a better chance of bringing him
under control (R155:61). During the take down Officer Vu was initially assisted by
the charge nurse while appellant swung and kicked at both of them, so Officer Vu
kicked appellant a couple of times and appellant "just kept fighting and fighting with
the officer and the nurse." (Rl 55:84,99). With the assistance of the charge nurse and
an E.R. doctor and another E.R. employee, Officer Vu was able to handcuff appellant's
hands and feet, (R155:61, 162), after which the stream of profanity continued, along
with appellant's threat to use his priesthood power to invoke God's revenge on the four
who subdued him within one week. (Rl55:62). At some point during the struggle
appellant's mother was knocked from her chair to the floor and chipped one of her
4

vertebrae. (Rl 55:149, 150). After appellant was taken under control police backup
arrived and hospital staff determined appellant's finger injury was "not life threatening
in any way." (R155:100, 101). Appellant still seemed "wild" and "crazy" in his
thoughts and his "verbal actions" toward Officer Vu and the hospital staff to the extent
he could not be treated. (R155:100, 101). The four or five SLCPD backup officers
then took appellant outside to sit on the sidewalk for thirty minutes or more, after
which appellant agreed to a sedative, whereupon he was treated for his cut finger.
(Rl 55:101, 102). Appellant was charged by information with three counts: Count 1:
Assault on a Health Care Provider - Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.7, Count 2: Assault
on a Police Officer - Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.4, and Count 3: Disorderly Conduct
- Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-102. After the City put on its case in chief consisting of the
evidence above, appellant moved for a directed verdict on Counts 1 and 2, both the
Assault charges. The trial court denied both motions, after which appellant put on his
case and all three counts were submitted to the jury. During closing argument
appellant's defense counsel argued that appellant may not have been able to form intent
because he was hallucinating, a point which the City disputes below, but she did not
raise the mental illness defense nor was it part of this trial: "Now, one.. .big element in
this is knowing that the person was a police officer .... Paul [appellant] got up and
said it could have been three cops, it could have been four.... [S]o, he doesn't really
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remember. Mom [appellant's mother] has testified he's different. He's not thinking
straight, he ... doesn't remember because he's in shock and he has no idea what's
going on. ... Probably knew it was a police officer because he said, ... I want a
doctor, I don't want a f***ing cop; so he probably knew he was a police officer. ...
[H]ave they proved what he knows? No. Because all the testimony has been that he's
hallucinating and he's different, and so have they proved that? No." (R155:194). This
vague assertion of what appellant on appeal argues was or should have been a mental
illness defense was not an issue at trial. The prosecutor's sum total response to this
vague assertion was this: "Additionally, I want to point out to you that him, you know,
not remembering that—what happened that day and him hallucinating, is—is not a
defense for what occurred here today [sic]." (Rl 55:197). After closing arguments the
case went to the jury and they acquitted on the Assault on a Healthcare Worker charge,
and convicted on both Assault on a Peace Officer and Disorderly Conduct. (Rl 55:199,
200). Appellant appealed, making three arguments: (1) The trial court erred as a matter
of law by ruling Officer Vu acted within the scope of his employment as a police
officer while working as part-time security for the hospital; (2) Appellant's counsel at
trial were ineffective because they did not raise a mental illness defense and because
they did not object to the alleged prosecutor misconduct; (3) The prosecutor's
argument that appellant's lack of memory and putative hallucinations were not a
6

defense was prosecutor misconduct.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Point I; The trial court's ruling that Officer Vu was acting within the scope of
his authority as a police officer while employed in his secondary employment as a
private security guard is consistent with the law in other jurisdictions which have ruled
on this issue.
Point II: Appellant's interwoven mental illness (or insanity) argument and
ineffective assistance of counsel argument presumes there was evidence of mental
illness, and requires a threshold fact-finding on appeal that appellant was mentally ill
when he assaulted Officer Vu.
Once appellant persuades this Court on appeal of that fact, appellant seeks to
have this Court evaluate defense trial counsel's performance against that appellate
finding of mental illness, and thereafter to rule that trial counsel in the court below was
ineffective by not raising the mental illness defense, and by not objecting to the
prosecutor's statement that the mental illness defense was not before the jury. Asking
this Court to make a finding of fact on appeal and then asking this Court to evaluate
trial counsel's performance in view of that appellate finding is not proper, and even if
it were proper, there is no evidence in the record to suggest appellant was mentally ill
(or insane) on the early morning in question.
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In addition, appellant has not perfected his appeal under Rule 23B of the Utah
Rules of Appellate procedure.
Point HI: The trial prosecutor did not commit prosecutor misconduct because
the prosecutor correctly stated the law of the case. ,ven if the prosecutor did misstate
the law, the trial court cured that misstatement.
ARGUMENT
Point One
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING THAT OFFICER VU ACTED
WITHIN THE SCOPE OF HIS AUTHORITY AS A PEACE OFFICER
WAS CORRECT.
A. Utah Code Ann. §76-5-102.4 contemplates that an off-duty police
officer may act within the scope of his authority for the purpose of assault
on a peace officer.
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-102.4 provides in pertinent part:
Any person who assaults a peace officer, with knowledge that he is a peace
officer, and when the peace officer is acting within the scope of his authority
as a peace officer, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
Id
Whether Officer Vu is a peace officer is not in question or disputed. Regarding
whether appellant had the requisite knowledge that Officer Vu is a peace officer, the
facts are conclusive: Officer Vu was in his distinct SLCPD uniform designed to inform
others of his identity (R155:63) and appellant himself identified Officer Vu two times
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as a peace officer in colloquial terms: "F*** you. I need to see a doctor, not a p**ing
cop." (R155:57,81).
The only question under this point is whether the trial court erred when it ruled
that Officer Vu was "acting within the scope of his authority as a peace officer" even
though he was off-duty and working in his secondary employment as a private security
guard. (R155:138). The thrust of appellant's argument seems to be that since Officer
Vu was off-duty, he cannot have been acting within the scope of his authority as a
police officer when he was assaulted.
Although this question has not been addressed directly in Utah, many other
jurisdictions have concluded in factually similar cases that police officers moonlighting
for private employers as security guards are engaged in official duties for the purposes
of officer assault statutes when, during the course of such secondary employment, they
react to incidents of what may be criminal or disorderly conduct.
Before discussing those cases, Justice Stewart's dissenting discussion of Utah
Code Ann. §76-5-102.4 in State v. Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568 (Utah 1991), in which he
recounted the then recent legislative history of that statute, militates toward the
conclusion that an off-duty police officer can act within the scope of his authority as a
police officer while off-duty on a purely statutory analysis:
The legislative history of the assault [on a police officer] statute gives guidance
in construing that provision. A 1987 amendment to that statute indicates a
legislative intent to make an assault on an officer a crime only when the officer
9

is acting within his or her authority. It is not enough to show that an officer was
on duty and performing his [or her] duties. Prior to the 1987 amendment, the
assault statute read: Any person who assaults a peace officer, with knowledge
that he is on duty, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5102.4 (1978). The amendment made clear thait being "on duty" was not
sufficient. The amended statute now reads: Any person who assaults a peace
officer, with knowledge that he is a peace officer,, < J when the peace officer is
acting within the scope of his authority as a peace officer, is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor.
Id. at 576-77 (emphasis added). It is clear from the amendment that the legislature
intended to expand the reach of the statute to make it a class A misdemeanor to assault
an off-duty officer. Formerly the statute required a defendant to know whether an
officer was on duty; now it requires only knowledge that he or she is a police officer,
regardless whether he or she is on or off-duty. That interpretation is consistent with
the applicable case law from other jurisdictions discussed below.
B. Case law from other jurisdictions supports the trial court's ruling that
Officer Vu was acting within the scope of his authority when appellant
swung a punch at him and otherwise assaulted him.
In State v. Wilen, 539 N.W.2d 650 (Neb. Ct. App. 1995), a peace officer was
working in a secondary employment capacity as a security guard at a Hardee's fastfood restaurant while wearing her official police uniform, sidearm, police badge and
police radio, Hardee's, rather than the police department, compensated her for this
secondary employment. Id at 655. During the course of investigating an accident on
the Hardee's lot the defendant tried to ram or run over the officer and was charged with
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attempted second degree assault on a police officer. The sole issue on appeal was
"clarifying when an officer is engaged in performance of his or her official duties"
under Nebraska statute. IdL at 656-57.
In ruling the off-duty officer was engaged in performance of her official duties,
the Wilen court noted that the "many other jurisdictions" which have ruled consistently
with the trial court in the instant matter have analyzed the question of "official duties"
under a test which examines "the nature of the secondary employment and the nature
of the acts being performed at the time of the incident." Id. at 658. The Wilen court
described this inquiry as being a three-pronged examination into "(1) the specific
nature, extent, and circumstances of the secondary employment; (2) the manner in
which such secondary employment is regarded by the employer and employee; (3) the
nature of the acts the peace officer-victim is performing at the time in question." Id.
Under the first prong, i.e., the specific nature, extent, and circumstances of the
secondary employment, the court first discussed "off-duty conduct generally" to place
secondary employment into context. IcL at 658, 660.
Prong 1(a): Primary employment and off-duty conduct generally. The court
noted that under the common law a person whose primary employment is that of a
police officer has certain powers, rights and duties both on and off duty. In connection
with off-duty obligations, the court noted a police officer is not relieved of his on-duty
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obligations and responsibilities:
A police officer on "off-duty" status is nevertheless not relieved of the
obligation as an officer to preserve the public peace and to protect the lives and
property of the citizens of the public in general. Indeed, police officers are
considered to be under a duty to respond as police officers 24 hours a day.
id., (quoting

EUGENE MCQUILLIN ET AL., THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS

§

45.15 at 123 (3d. ed. 1992)). The court further noted that, "it has been widely held
that a police officer is not relieved of his or her obligation to preserve the peace while
off duty/5 that the Nebraska statute describing police officer duties did not "distinguish
between the authority and obligations of police officers on or off duty or in or out of
uniform/' concluding that "under proper circumstances, police officers have a duty to
preserve the peace and to respond as peace officers at all times." Id at 559-60. The
court then applied that conclusion to secondary employment.
Prong 1(b): Secondary employment. The court stated that its analysis described
above indicated that "a police officer retains his or her police officer status, even while
off duty in a secondary employment capacity, unless it is clear from the nature of the
officer's activities that he or she is acting exclusively in a private capacity or is
engaging in his or her own private business." Wilen, 539 N.W.2d at 660. In addition,
sound public policy supports the practice of private establishments employing
uniformed, off-duty police officers to keep peace and security:
[The] practice of municipalities which allows law enforcement officers, while
off duty and in uniform, to serve as peace-keepers in private establishments
12

open to the general public is in the public interest. The presence of uniformed
officers in places susceptible to breaches of the peace deters unlawful acts and
conduct by patrons in those places. The public knows the uniform and the
badge stand for the authority of the government. The public generally knows
that law enforcement officers have the duty to serve and protect them at all
times. ... [A] defendant will be charged with knowledge of the uniformed
officer's official status where circumstances warrant. ... An official uniform
implies an official status....
Id
This is true even where "knowledge of [a] police officer's official status" is
"inferred" from a defendant's observation of a "uniform or badge" but no verbal
disclosure is made by the police officer. Id. In addition, "the public expects that a
uniformed law enforcement officer has the power to enforce the law and to arrest
where necessary, powers which a private security guard generally does not possess."
Id. Applying that analysis to the Wilen facts, the court stated that "the functions [the
officer] performed for Hardee's, in general and on the evening in question, are
consistent with the powers and duties of her primary employment as a law enforcement
officer for the City of [her jurisdiction]." Similarly in the instant case, Officer Vu's
actions of attempting to calm down appellant, and then, when appellant became
threatening to the charge nurse, to physically take him under control and eventually
arrest him, were functions consistent with the powers and duties of his primary
employment as a law enforcement officer with SLCPD, i.e., to preserve the public
peace and to protect the lives of citizens.
13

Prong 2: The manner in which such secondary employment is regarded by the
employer and employee: The court stated the officer's duties to her secondary
employer were supplemental to her primary employment as a peace officer and her
attendant duties to keep the peace, which is universally regarded as official law
enforcement duty:
It is clear that [the officer] performed duties for Hardee's that were
supplemental to her primary duties of law enforcement on behalf of the general
public. The fact that [the officer] received compensation from Hardee's, along
with her salary from public employment, is of no consequence. Pursuant to her
primary employment with the city ... her ultimate duty was to enforce the law
and ensure the safety of the public at large. The record suggests that Hardee's
hired [the officer] and other police officers on the basis of their official status
and the advantages this status would provide in their peacekeeping function.
While [the officer's] primary official status and secondary services benefited
Hardee's, her goal always was to keep the peace, universally regarded as an
official law enforcement duty.
Id. Similarly in the instant case, Officer Vu' s duties to the hospital were supplemental
to those of his duties of law enforcement to the general public. As in Wilen, the fact
that he was paid by the hospital should be of no consequence. Additionally, as in
Wilen, it seems axiomatic that the hospital hired Officer Vu because of his official
status as a SLCPD peace officer and for the advantages that official status would
provide. While Officer Vu's primary official status and secondary services benefited
the hospital, his goal was always to meet his law enforcement duty, which he did on
the night in question. It was to Officer Vu, fully uniformed, that the hospital looked
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for peace keeping functions, and it was Officer Vu who appellant punched and kicked
at, and appellant should be charged with, or have imputed to him, the knowledge of
Officer Vu's official status.
Prong 3: The nature of the acts the peace officer-victim is performing at the
time in question: The Wilen court noted that [the officer] "responded to and
investigated the accident in an official and professional manner[,]... testified in detail
regarding her observations of [defendant's] possible state of intoxication[,]" which
testimony "was comparable to that of police officers in criminal ... cases generally"
without regard to on-duty or off-duty status. In the instant case, the nature of the acts
Officer Vu performed in seeking to calm appellant and then taking him under control
are more than comparable to actions he would routinely take in a situation involving
assaultive or disorderly conduct to which a peace officer responds, they are
indistinguishable from such actions.
A different analytical approach is found in State v. Graham, 927 P.2d 227
(Wash. 1996). There two off-duty police officers wearing police bicycle patrol
uniforms were working as private security guards when they noticed defendant
carrying a large sum of money and what appeared to be a baggie of rock cocaine. Id at
229. When the officers spoke to defendant he ran from them, after which the officers
caught him while he tried to get into a taxi and defendant flailed, kicked and screamed
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at the officers. Id. He was arrested for resisting arrest and obstructing a public servant.
Id
On appeal defendant argued that a uniformed off-duty police officer working as
a private security guard could not be a public servant performing official duties fo/ 'he
purposes of the obstructing statute and was not a peace officer for the purposes of the
resisting statute. The court of appeals affirmed, finding that a police officer, whether
on or off duty, was a public servant and a peace officer. Id at 230. It also found that
the officers stepped out of their roles as private security guards and into their roles as
police officers when the stopped defendant. Id.
In affirming the court of appeals, the Washington Supreme Court, as a threshold
matter held that "an off duty police officer is a public servant, with the authority to
respond to emergencies and to react to criminal conduct." Id at 231. The question
was "whether an off-duty officer can discharge his or her "official" duties at the same
time the officer is working as a private security guard." Id The court first reviewed
the relevant case law discussing the policy underlying such an inquiry, noting that the
cases indicate the inquiry is fact intensive to "determine whether the officer was acting
on behalf of the private employer or, instead, was discharging his or her official
powers and duties." Id (citing Tapp v. State, 406 N.E.2d 296 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (it
is the nature of the acts performed and not whether the officer is on or off duty, in or
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out of uniform, which determines whether the officer is engaged in the performance of
his official duties). See also, State v. Robinson, 379 So. 2d 712 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1980) (an officer's "off-duty" status is not a limitation upon his right to exercise police
authority in the presence of criminal activity); Williams v. State, 172 N.W.2d 31 (Wis.
1969) (once officer became aware of fight and took actions to stop it, he was no longer
off duty - stepping into a crowd to break up a fight was not a "personal frolic").
After that discussion the court stated its view that public policy is furthered by
the rule that a police officer is a peace officer with authority to act as such whenever
the officer reasonably believes that a crime is committed in his or her presence,
whether the officer is on duty or off duty:
In our view, public policy is furthered by the rule that a police officer is a public
servant or peace officer who has the authority to act as a police officer whenever
a crime is being committed whether on or off duty. This is particularly true
when the officer is in uniform or when the officer is otherwise identified as a
police officer.
Graham, 927 P.2d at 233 (citing State v. De Santo, 410 A.2d 704 (N.J. Super. Ct App.
Div., N.J. 1980) (the police uniform has the same significance to the public whether
the officer is technically on or off duty). The court further stated that when the officers
began acting as police officers rather than security guards, i.e., when the stopped
defendant, they stepped out of their roles as security guards and into their roles as
peace officers:

17

In the present case, the officers involved were in uniform and were armed.
Their job as security guards was to patrol the streets, not to arrest drug
offenders. ... They identified themselves as police officers and the defendant
believed them to be police officers. ... When the officers stopped the
defendant, they stepped out of their roles as security guards and into their roles
as police officers. They were identified as police officers and their status as
police officers wa- known to the defendant. The officers were acting as public
servants who were discharging their official duties ... at the time they were
involved with the defendant.
Graham, 927 P.2d at 233. nl. Similarly, in the instant matter, Officer Vu was in
uniform, he was at the hospital working as part-time security and among his duties was
to ask people whether they need to see a doctor and whether they need help. (Rl 55:62,
64, 65). n2. He was known by appellant to be a police officer: "F*** you. I need to

nl See also. State v. Brown, 989 S.W.2d 652 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (stating, "We agree
with the reasoning of those cases which hold that ... an off-duty law enforcement
officer employed as a private security guard is engaged in the performance of duties
imposed on him by law."); State v. Sanchez, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 2546 (Ohio
Misc.) (holding that a police officer's "duties are not limited to times when Ihe police
officer is officially on duty or 'on the clock"'); De Santo, 410 A.2d 704 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div., N.J. 1980) (notwithstanding defendant's claim that since uniformed
police officer was being paid by a private company the most defendant could be
convicted of was assault, the court upheld conviction of assault on peace officer, noting
"the uniform has the same significance to the public whether the wearer is technically
on or off duty.. ..in such a situation the municipality and its public expect and obtain
real benefits from the police officer.") (internal brackets omitted).
n2 There was no testimony either way about whether Officer Vu was armed, though it
is safe to assume he was. Regardless, his being un-armed would not be harmful to the
City's argument. See Williams v. State, 172 N.W.2d 31 (Wis. 1969) (where uniformed
off-duty officer en route home after secondary employment as a security guard had
removed his gun belt did not affect ruling that he was victim of assault on a peace
officer when he got out of his private car to break up a fight).
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see a doctor, not a f***ing cop." (R155:57). When appellant began his threatening
behavior toward the charge nurse, and Officer Vu determined to take him under
control, Officer Vu stepped out of his role as a security guard and into his role as a
police officer. He was acting as a public servant who was discharging his official
duties within the scope of his authority as a police officer, and this Court should so
hold.
There is another analytical point the City requests this Court to consider.
Assume the following for the sake of discussion: Officer Vu was both off-duty and not
working as part-time security for the hospital, but just happened to be there after work
fully uniformed to pick up a prescription when he noticed appellant's disorderly and
threatening behavior. Assume further that Officer Vu thereupon acted as he did in the
instant case, first seeking to calm appellant and then determining it best to take
appellant under control. In such a case, appellant could not plausibly argue that
Officer Vu was acting outside the scope of his authority as a police officer. The
analysis would be very straight forward, i.e., when Officer Vu observed the disorderly
and threatening behavior and acted thereon, he would be stepping into his duty-bound
role to keep or restore the public peace. The City, therefore, asks rhetorically, why
should the analysis change simply because Officer Vu was working as private security
for the hospital?
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C. The terms "discharge of official powers," "official duties," and "scope of
authority" are analogous for police officer assault statutes.
It may fairly be asked whether the terms "discharge of official powers or duties,"
See Graham, 927 P.2d 227 (Wash. 1996), and "official duties," See Wilen, 539 N. W.
2d 650 (Neb. Ct. App. 1995), are analogous to the term "scope of his authority" as
stated in Utah's assault on a peace officer statute. In Olvmpia Child Dev. Ctr, Inc. et al
v. City of Marysville, Tennessee, 1999 Tenn. App. Lexis 77 (Term. App. 1999), the
court, inter alia, addressed the question, "[M]ust a police officer be on an official duty
shift in order to be considered as acting "in the scope of his [sic] employment?"' Id. at
f 8. This was a tort action arising where an off-duty police officer defendant driving a
private car struck plaintiffs van while that off-duty officer was pursuing a third
vehicle which was speeding. The court ruled that "we are of the opinion that an officer
does not necessarily have to be on an official shift or "on the clock" to act within the
scope of his or her employment." Id. at f9. Citing noted tort authorities Prosser and
Keeton, the court supported its ruling by noting that the phrase "scope of
employment":
[R]efers to those acts which are so closely connected with what the servant is
employed to do, and so fairly and reasonably incidental to it, that they may be
regarded as methods... of carrying out the objectives of the employment. ... It
has been said that ... the servant's conduct is within the scope of his
employment if it is of the kind which he is employed to perform, occurs
substantially within the authorized limits of time and space, and is actuated, at
least in part, by a purpose to serve the master.
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W. (citing W. PAGE KEETON, ET. AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §
70(5 th ed. 1984)); see also, United States v. Heliczer, 373 F.2d 241,245 (2d Cir. 1967
(stating, "[Performance of official duties[ ] is simply acting within the scope of what
the [federal narcotics] agent is employed to do.").
In the instant case, Officer Vu's conduct of apprehending a disorderly and
threatening person was directly connected to his duties to his primary employer
SLCPD to keep the peace and protect citizens that they may be regarded as methods of
carrying out the objectives of his primary employment. Further, given a peace
officer's 24/7 responsibilities and duties as discussed above, Officer Vu's actions were
within the authorized limits of time and space of his employment and were clearly
actuated by a purpose to serve his master/primary employer.
In addition, the City suggests that if this were a civil tort action, with appellant
as a plaintiff for injuries suffered during the take down, appellant would likely be
strenuously arguing that Officer Vu was carrying out his official duties as a peace
officer and thus acting within the scope of his authority as a peace officer so as to join
a second deep-pocket employer - SLCPD - as a party to his civil tort action.
Moreover, the Restatement Second of Agency provides that a to be within the
scope of the employment, conduct must be of the same general nature as that
authorized, or incidental to the conduct authorized."
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RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF

AGENCY

§ 229 (1958). Officer Vu's actions were clearly of the same general nature as

that authorized by his employer SLCPD and thus were within the scope of authority
under the Assault on a Peace Officer statute at issue here.
D. Workers compensation analysis supports the City's argument that
Officer Vu was acting within the scope of his authority and employment
during his actions.
City ofHialeah v.Weber, 491 So. 2d 1204 (Fla. Ct. App. 1989), was a workers
compensation case where a uniform wearing off-duty police officer claimant who was
injured while working in his secondary weekend security guard job sought benefits
from his primary employer police department for injuries sustained while quelling a
vandalism incident. Id. at 1205. In upholding the order requiring the officer's primary
employer police department to pay workers compensation benefits, the court held on
the facts that "the evidence in this case establishes unequivocally that claimant was
performing his job as a police officer for the City at the time of his injuries." Id. In
addition, "claimant's injuries arose out of his actions in perfecting the arrest of persons
committing [criminal] acts ...." Id.
When Officer Vu began perfecting the arrest of appellant he was performing his
job as a police officer and not as a private security guard, regardless whether the terms
"scope of employment," "scope of authority" or "official duties" are used to describe
his conduct.
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E. Officer Vu was not on a "personal frolic."
Appellant argues Officer Vu was engaged in a personal frolic when he sought to
calm and then take appellant under control and arrest him. A claim that an off-duty
police officer who engaged in police actions was on a personal frolic was made and
rejected in Williams v. State, 172N.W.2d31 (Wis. 1969). There a police-uniformed,
off-duty police officer was en route home in his private car after finishing working in
his secondary employment as a part-time security guard when he drove by a fight or
struggle on the sidewalk. Id. at 46. When the officer got out to break up the
altercation he was assaulted. IdL at 46-47. Defendant argued the officer was not acting
in his "official capacity/' citing the "personal frolic" language of United States v.
Heliczer, 373 F.2d 241, 245 (2nd Cir. 1967). Id at 47-48. In rejecting that claim, the
Williams court stated that in attempting to preserve the public peace and order the
officer was not on a "personal frolic:"
[W]hen he came onto the scene at the intersection he felt the fight had to be
broken up .... It is true that Hill was not on duty when he first saw the fight.
However, as soon as he became aware of the situation and took action he was no
longer off duty. Hill did what any officer of the law is supposed to do, and
attempted to preserve public peace and order. It was certainly no "personal
frolic" for him to stop his car, step into the middle of a crowd and on his own,
attempt to break up a fight. There is, therefore no merit in defendant's assertion
that Hill was not acting in his official capacity when the offense took place.
Id. It simply cannot be argued plausibly that an officer carrying out official duties or
acting within the scope of his authority is on a personal frolic.
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Based on the foregoing points and authorities this Court should rule that Officer
Vu was acting within the scope of his authority as a police officer when appellant
assaulted him.
Point Two
APPELLANT'S INTERWOVEN MENTAL ILLNESS DEFENSE
ARGUMENT AND INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
ARGUMENT ARE NOT WELL-FOUNDED.
Appellant's interwoven mental illness (or insanity) argument and ineffective
assistance of counsel argument assumes there was evidence of mental illness, and
requires a threshold finding of fact on appeal that appellant was mentally ill. Once
appellant persuades this Court on appeal of that fact, appellant seeks to have this Court
evaluate defense trial counsel's performance against that appellatefindingof fact of
mental illness, and thereafter to rule that trial counsel was ineffective by not raising the
mental illness defense and by not objecting to the prosecutor's statement that the
mental illness defense was not before the jury. Asking this Court to make a finding of
fact on appeal and then asking this Court to evaluate trial counsel's performance in
view of that appellate finding is not proper, and even if it were proper, there is no
evidence in the record to suggest appellant was mentally ill (or insane) on the early
morning in question. In addition, appellant has not perfected his appeal under Rule
23B of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
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A. There is no evidence in the record to suggest appellant was mentally
ill when he assaulted Officer Vu.
Appellant, by claiming he was mentally ill, raises what used to be called the
ir sanity defense. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305(2). As a point of beginning this
Court should look to the record to evaluate whether there is any evidence whatsoever
that appellant was mentally ill when he assaulted Officer Vu, or whether appellant's
raising this issue on appeal is a speculative assertion of facts on which the record is
silent. The record speaks clearly that appellant was not mentally ill on the early
morning in question. All of the following comes from appellant's own testimony at
trial and is relevant to his mental state on the early morning in question: Appellant was
capable of subtly gauging the strength of his pushes in the pushing contest with his
brother that led up to his having his finger cut. (R155:157). Appellant got mad at
having his finger cut, he did not get mentally ill. (Rl 55:157). Appellant was capable
of forming the thought to show his mother, who had just entered the room, his finger
and to simultaneously observe his brother leaving the room, (R155:158). Appellant
was capable of distinguishing his thoughts of anger at his brother from his desire to
have his cut finger attended to. (Rl 55:158). Appellant was capable of perceiving his
own level of anger. (R155:159). Appellant was lucid enough to distinguish between
people at the hospital. (155:159). Appellant, in his own words, was "just totally
passive and peaceful" in what he claims was blind side surprise attack take down by
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Officer Vu and others. Taking the higher ground by being peaceful in the face of
supposed physical surprise attacks is not the response of a mentally ill person.
Appellant was capable of identifying the exact anatomical place on his body - his
kidneys - where his supposed surprise attackers were supposedly punching and kicking
him. (R155:161). Appellant was capable of exercising his memory capacity by
remembering his mother's words to his supposed surprise attackers. (R155:161).
Appellant was cognizant enough of his medical condition to know he should elevate
his finger while he was waiting for treatment. (Rl 55:162,). Appellant was capable of
distinguishing whether or not conversations between the officers were humorous and
in jest, and this was after the supposed surprise attack. (Rl 55:162). By Officer Vu's
testimony and that of the admissions tech, Appellant was capable of determining which
kind of professional assistance he needed, i.e., a doctor/medical services, not a
cop/police services. (Rl55:82).
The only evidence describing appellant which could remotely be strained to call
into question appellant's mental state are those of some witnesses, not alienists or
doctors, who without diagnosis casually used terms like shock, psychosis and
hallucinations in colloquial terms. However, at sentencing appellant's counsel referred
to the possible benefits of domestic violence counseling and alcohol counseling, with
the suggestion that alcohol was at the root of some of appellant's aberrant behavior.
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(Rl 55:204). Appellant himself attributed some of his conduct to "things that have
been down inside of me that have ... bothered me." (R155:204).
This is a far cry from the conclusions of a defendant's mental state a trial court
sometimes reaches after full-blown competency proceedings involving multiple courtappointed alienists to determine a defendant's mental state. See, e.g., State v. Laffertv,
2001 UT 19, 20 P.3d 342. There is simply nothing in the record to which appellant
can point, except for a speculative allegation of facts, not hinted at in the record, that
defendant's mental state was a point of reasonable inquiry that trial counsel should
have made. If people who engage in domestic violence, occasionally or habitually
abuse alcohol, and/or have past life events that bother them and cause them anger are
permitted to use the mental illness defense, it could be argued that a high percentage of
the population of those charged with public offenses could use the mental illness
defense. It is axiomatic that the criminal court dockets are full of parties who carry
anger and get very upset at times but are not mentally ill.
There should be no mistake, appellant was angry, lashing out with yelling and
profanity at whoever was near him, whether it be his mother who brought him to the
hospital, the admissions tech who tried to help him, Officer Vu who tried to calm him,
the charge nurse who tried to calm him, after which he became physically threatening
to those near him, but he was not mentally ill when he assaulted Officer Vu.
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Importantly, Appellant "de-escalated, he had become calmer," (R155:119)
which lends further support to the City's argument that Appellant's conduct was the
result of a fit of temper and not mental illness. Officer Vu compared him to others
who come in "irate and stuff, when they're demanding to see a family member's [sic]
who's been in trauma." (Rl55:75).
When a non-alienist or non-medical doctor uses terms like "hallucinations" that
does not mean there is evidence of hallucination in the clinical sense of the word.
Perhaps if there was evidence of audio hallucinations of loud freight train noises or
tidal waves crashing noises that were not really there, or evidence of visual
hallucinations of rotating heads or person-sized birdsflyingin the E.R., there might be
reason for concern about hallucinations. But there is none of this, and casual and
unfounded assertions of mental illness should not be recognized by this Court. It is
absolutely clear that appellant, based on his own testimony cited above, did not think
he was mentally ill or even hallucinating.
Appellant is asking this Court on appeal to telescope down into the trial
proceedings and find evidence and then make its own fact determination of bona fide
mental illness that somehow was missed by an experienced trial judge, two
experienced public defenders and appellant himself. Appellant is then further asking
this Court to conclude that the non-existent evidence should have led defense trial
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counsel to detect that appellant was laboring under "organic brain damage" or
"delirium" or some other identifiable, diagnosable condition rendering him a danger to
himself, or incapable of providing the necessities of life, n3 in need of hospital care
rather than incarceration—all so as to exonerate or excuse defendant from the
consequences of assaultive conduct. See State v. De Plonty, 749 P.2d 621,626 (Utah
1987).
In Jacobs v. State, 2001 UT 17, 20 P.3d 382, |22, defendant raised an
ineffectiveness claim based on failure to pursue a competency hearing, citing "(1) his
bizarre behavior after arrest, (2) contradictions in the alienests' reports, i.e., findings
that he was actively psychotic and otherwise mentally ill and yet competent to stand
trial, and (3) the trial court's expressed willingness to conduct a competency hearing
before proceeding to trial." IdL Yet the court still found "that it was reasonable for
defense counsel to forego the competency hearing and allow Jacobs to plead guilty,"
f 24, and that those factors "fail[ed] to demonstrate that Jacobs's counsel's performance
fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment." IdL at f 23.
In the instant case there is no evidence of bizarre post arrest behavior, no alienist
reports and no expression from the trial court about a willingness to hold a competency
hearing. While mental illness or insanity at the time an offense is committed is a

n3 On this point it should be noted appellant was married for twenty-eight years
and helped provide for his eight children. (R155:204).
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different concept than competency to stand trial as discussed in Jacobs, counsel's
decision on whether to assert mental illness or insanity as a defense should not be
disturbed so long as it does not fall below an objective standard of reasonable
profe jional judgment.
In the instant case, where the City has cited ample evidence of appellant's
positive mental state and ability to reason when he assaulted Officer Vu, his counsel's
decision not to assert mental illness or insanity as a defense should not be disturbed.
While appellant's behavior may have been bizarre, volatile or irrational, that does not
mean he lacked the mental state required as an element of the offense. Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-2-305.
B. Appellant's failure to meet the Rule 23B requirement should result in
dismissal of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
Rule 23B of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure states in relevant part:
Rule 23B. Motion to remand for findings necessary to determination of
ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
(a) A party to an appeal in a criminal case may move the court to remand the
case to the trial court for entry of findings of fact, necessary for the appellate
court's determination of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The motion
shall be available only upon a nonspeculative allegation of facts, not fully
appearing in the record on appeal, which, if true, could support a determination
that counsel was ineffective. The motion shall be filed prior to the filing of the
appellant's brief. Upon a showing of good cause, Ihe court may permit a motion
to be filed after the filing of the appellant's brief.
(b)... The motion shall include or be accompanied by affidavits alleging facts
not fully appearing in the record on appeal that show the claimed deficient
performance of the attorney. The affidavits shall also allege facts that show the
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claimed prejudice suffered by the appellant as a result of the claimed deficient
performance. The motion shall also be accompanied by a proposed order or
remand that identifies the ineffectiveness claims and specifies the factual issues
relevant to each such claim to be addressed on remand.
Appellant has not filed a motion for a remand prior to filing his brief; has only
cited speculative facts and colloquial references; has not filed any affidavits showing
the claimed deficient performance of his trial counsel; has not filed a proposed order
identifying the ineffectiveness claims and specifying the relevant factual issues to be
addressed on remand; and appellant has not even alluded to an extant competency
evaluation.
Appellant's ineffectiveness argument that the mental illness defense was not
raised and that defense trial counsel failed to object to the prosecutor's statement,
therefore, should be dismissed by this Court because it has not been perfected. "Rule
23B is directed to cases where some crucial factual information is absent from the
record." State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461 (UtahCt App. 1993), The crucial, absent
information here is the complete dearth of evidence of defendant's supposed mental
illness, and appellant should have sought this information prior to filing of his brief,
but appellant could not because it does not exist.
If this Court is considering entertaining appellant's good cause argument to
permit a post-brief filing of a motion for a remand, the City argues against such a
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remand because despite the voluminous record showing defendant may have anger,
temper tantrum and alcohol difficulties, nothing comes close to showing mental illness
contemplated by § 76-2-305, i.e., that he was insane on the early morning in question.
Finally, even if appellant somehow has perfected this point of appeal, since there
is no evidence of mental illness, trial defense counsel's failure to raise it as a defense
and to object when the prosecutor said appellant's lack of memory and supposed
hallucinations were not a defense, cannot be ineffective assistance of counsel.
Point Three

THE TRIAL PROSECUTOR DID NOT COMMIT PROSECUTOR
MISCONDUCT.
During trial defense counsel's closing argument she loosely argued that
appellant may not have been able to form intent because he was hallucinating, a point
which the City has disputed above. The trial prosecutor's sum total response to the
vaguely hinted at but un-asserted mental illness defense was this: "Additionally, I want
to point out to you that him, you know, not remembering that—what happened that day
and him hallucinating, is—is not a defense for what occurred here today."
(R155:197). That is the one sentence in the record upon which appellant bases his
prosecutor misconduct allegation.
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The trial prosecutor was correct on both points. Regarding the prosecutor's
statement that appellant's not remembering was not a defense, the prosecutor was
correct: "That a defendant is subsequently unable to remember is in itself no proof of
his mental condition at the time the crime was committed/5 State v. Jenner, 451
N.W.2d 710, 721 (S.D. 1990).

If memory loss were a defense to a crime, every

defendant could simply take the stand and testify they do not remember the events
giving rise to their charges and thereby be acquitted.
That leaves the words "him hallucinating" as the entire basis of appellant's
prosecutor misconduct claim. However, the prosecutor was also correct on this point.
The law of the case at trial was that mental illness was not affirmatively raised and
developed as a defense, either by defense counsel or as reflected in the jury
instructions. Appellant's supposed hallucinations, a word used casually by a nonalienist, non-medical doctor witness who did not diagnose appellant, was not a defense
in the case. An accurate statement of the law of the case cannot possibly give rise to a
prosecutor misconduct claim.
Even if mental illness somehow was an affirmative defense at issue in this trial
that was simply missed by the trial judge, the defense counsel and the prosecutor—and
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not reflected in the record including the jury instructions—the prosecutor's statement
about "his hallucinations" not being a defense was cured by the trial judge.
This Court will reverse for prosecutor misconduct only if appellant has shown
that (1) "the actions or remarks of prosecuting counsel call to the attention of the jury a
matter it would not be justified in considering in determining its verdict and, if so, (2)
under the circumstances of the particular case, whether the error is substantial and
prejudicial such that there is a reasonable likelihood that, in its absence, there would
have been a more favorable result." State v. Longshaw, 961 P.2d 925, 928-29 (Utah
Ct. App. 1998).
Misstating the law meets the first step of the above test. Id at 929. Regarding
the prejudice step, the trial judge cured the misstatement when he said: "If either
lawyer's arguments include statements of the law which differ from the law which I've
given you, you should disregard such statements and rely entirely on the law as given
to you by the Court." (Rl 55:174). Such a curative instruction was given and held to
be curative in Longshaw, 961 P.2d at 929-30 ("misstatements of the law do not
prejudice a defendant where the error has been satisfactorily corrected.")
Even assuming, arguendo, that the prosecutor's statement could somehow be
construed as informing the jury that intent (as opposed to mental illness) was not an
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element or fact issue, which would be legally incorrect for the offenses charged, that
statement was cured by the jury instructions relating to intent. See Jury Instructions
11-13 as read by the trial judge. (R155:174-178).
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing points, authorities and arguments, the trial court's ruling
that Officer Vu was acting within the scope of his employment should be upheld.
Further, appellant's claim that trial defense counsel was ineffective by failing to assert
a mental illness defense should be rejected because appellant has failed to perfect his
appeal on this point, and because of the voluminous facts in the record showing that
appellant was not mentally ill when he assaulted Officer Vu. Finally, the prosecutor's
statement to the effect that the mental illness defense was not at issue, was not
prosecutor misconduct since mental illness was, in fact, not an issue at trial. Even if it
had been an issue, the trial court cured the prosecutor's alleged misstatement.
Respectfully submitted this f """gay of June 2006.
SALT LAKE CITY CORP.

Edward A. Berkovich
Attorney for Appellee

35

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on this

/

gay of June 2006,1 caused to be mailed by

United States mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF
OF APPELLEE to the following:
Jennifer K. Gowans (7538)
Fillmore Spencer LLC
Jamestown Square
3301 North University Ave.
Provo, Utah 84604

36

ADDENDA

ADDENDUM "A
Statutes

76-2-305. Mental illness - Use as a defense - Influence of alcohol or other
substance voluntarily consumed - Definition.
(1) (a) It is a defense to a prosecution under any statute or ordinance that the
defendant, as a result of mental illness, lacked the mental state required as an element of
the offense charged.
(b) Mental illness is not otherwise a defense, but may be evidence in mitigation of the
penalty in a capital felony under Section 76-3-207 and may be evidence of special
mitigation reducing the level of a criminal homicide or attempted criminal homicide
offense under Section 76-5-205.5.
(2) The defense defined in this section includes the defenses known as "insanity" and
"diminished mental capacity."
(3) A person who asserts a defense of insanity or diminished mental capacity, and who
is under the influence of voluntarily consumed, injected, or ingested alcohol, controlled
substances, or volatile substances at the time of the alleged offense is not excused from
criminal responsibility on the basis of mental illness if the alcohol or substance caused,
triggered, or substantially contributed to the mental illness.
(4) (a) "Mental illness" means a mental disease or defect that substantially impairs a
person's mental, emotional, or behavioral functioning. A mental defect may be a
congenital condition, the result of injury, or a residual effect of a physical or mental
disease and includes, but is not limited to, mental retardation.
(b) "Mental illness" does not mean an abnormality manifested primarily by repeated
criminal conduct.
(5) "Mental retardation" means a significant subaverage general intellectual
functioning, existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior, and manifested prior
to age 22.
Amended by Chapter 11, 2003 General Session

76-5-102.4. Assault against peace officer - Penalty.
(1) Any person who assaults a peace officer, with knowledge that he is a peace officer,
and when the peace officer is acting within the scope of his authority as a peace officer, is
guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(2) A person who violates this section shall serve, in jail or another correctional
facility, a minimum of:
(a) 90 consecutive days for a second offense; and
(b) 180 consecutive days for each subsequent offense.
(3) The court may suspend the imposition or execution of the sentence required under
Subsection (2) if the court finds that the interests of justice would be best served and
makes specific findings concerning the disposition in writing or on the record.
Amended by Chapter 172, 1998 General Session

76-5-102. Assault
(1) Assault is:
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to another;
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to do bodily
injury to another; or
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes bodily injury to
another or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another.
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor.
(3) Assault is a class A misdemeanor if:
(a) the person causes substantial bodily injury to another; or
(b) the victim is pregnant and the person has knowledge of the pregnancy.
(4) It is not a defense against assault, that the accused caused serious bodily injury to
another.

Amended by Chapter 109, 2003 General Session

Addenda "B"
Rule 23B of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure

Page 1 of 1
Rule 23B, Motion to remand for findings necessary to determination of ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
(a) Grounds for motion time A party to an appeal in a criminal case may move the court to remand the case to the trial
court for entry of findings of fact, necessary for the appellate court's determination of a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel The motion shall be available only upon a nonspeculatsve allegation of facts not fully appearing in the record
on appeal which if true could support a determination that counsel was ineffective
The motion shall be filed prior to the filing of the appellant's brief Upon a showing of good cause, the court may permit
a motion to be filed after the filing of the appellant's brief In no event shall the court permit a motion to be filed after
oral argument Nothing in this rule shall prohibit the court from remanding the case under this rule on its own motion at
any time if the claim has been raised and the motion would have been available to a party
(b) Content of motion, response, reply The content of the motion shall conform to the requirements of Rule 23 The
motion shall include or be accompanied by affidavits alleging facts not fully appearing in the record on appeal that
show the claimed deficient performance of the attorney The affidavits shall also allege facts that show the claimed
prejudice suffered by the appellant as a result of the claimed deficient performance The motion shall also be
accompanied by a proposed order or remand that identifies the ineffectiveness claims and specifies the factual issues
relevant to each such claim to be addressed on remand
A response shall be filed within 20 days after the motion is filed The response shall include a proposed order of
remand that identifies the ineffectiveness claims and specifies the factual issues relevant to each such claim to be
addressed by the trial court in the event remand is granted, unless the responding party accepts that proposed by the
moving party Any reply shall be filed within 10 days after the response is filed
(c) Order of the court If the requirements of parts (a) and (b) of this rule have been met the court may order that the
case be temporarily remanded to the tnal court for the purpose of entry of findings of fact relevant to a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel The order of remand shall identify the ineffectiveness claims and specify the factual
issues relevant to each such claim to be addressed by the tnal court The order shall also direct the trial court to
complete the proceedings on remand within 90 days of issuance of the order of remand, absent a finding by the trial
court of good cause for a delay of reasonable length
if st appears to the appellate court that the appellant's attorney of record on the appeal faces a conflict of interest upon
remand, the court shall direct that counsel withdraw and that new counsel for the appellant be appointed or retained
(d) Effect on appeal Oral argument and the deadlines for briefs shall be vacated upon the filing of a motion to remand
under this rule Other procedural steps required by these rules shall not be stayed by a motion for remand unless a
stay is ordered by the court upon stipulation or motion of the parties or upon the court's motion
(e) Proceedings before the trial court Upon remand the trial court shall promptly conduct hearings and take evidence
as necessary to enter the findings of fact necessary to determine the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel Any
claims of ineffectiveness not identified in the order of remand shall not be considered by the trial court on remand,
unless the trial court determines that the interests of justice or judicial efficiency require consideration of issues not
specifically identified in the order of remand Evidentiary hearings shall be conducted without a jury and as soon as
practicable after remand The burden of proving a fact shall be upon the proponent of the fact The standard of proof
shall be a preponderance of the evidence The trial court shall enter written findings of fact concerning the claimed
deficient performance by counsel and the claimed prejudice suffered by appellant as a result in accordance with the
order of remand Proceedings on remand shall be completed within 90 days of entry of the order of remand, unless the
trial court finds good cause for a delay of reasonable length
(f) Preparation and transmittal of the record At the conclusion of all proceedings before the trial court, the clerk of the
tnal court and the court reporter shall immediately prepare the record of the supplemental proceedings as required by
these rules If the record of the original proceedings before the trial court has been transmitted to the appellate court,
the clerk of the trial court shall immediately transmit the record of the supplemental proceedings upon preparation of
the supplemental record If the record of the original proceedings before the trial court has not been transmitted to the
appellate court, the clerk of the court shall transmit the record of the supplemental proceedings upon the preparation of
the entire record
(g) Appellate court determination Upon receipt of the record from the trial court, the clerk of the court shall notify the
parties of the new schedule for briefing or oral argument under these rules Errors claimed to have been made during
the trial court proceedings conducted pursuant to this rule are reviewable under the same standards as the review of
errors in other appeals The findings of fact entered pursuant to this rule are reviewable under the same standards as
the review of findings of fact in other appeals

